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STATE-SUPPORTED DISPLAY OF
RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS IN THE
PUBLIC SPACE
SILVIO FERRARIt
INTRODUCTION

In 1980, in Stone v. Graham, the United States Supreme
Court held that displaying a plaque with the text of the Ten
Commandments in Kentucky public schools violated the
Establishment Clause.' Despite the fact that the plaque included
a short inscription that highlighted the significance of the Ten
Commandments as a foundation of the legal tradition of Western
civilization and, in particular, of the United States, the Court
concluded that the law authorizing the display was "plainly
religious" and had "no secular legislative purpose."2 In 2011, in
Lautsi v. Italy, the European Court of Human Rights ("ECtHR")
decided that displaying a crucifix in Italian public schools did not
infringe Article 9 of the European Convention of Human Rights
(the "Convention") or Article 2 of the first Additional Protocol to
the Convention.' The ECtHR reasoned that the crucifix was
merely a "passive" religious symbol-an argument explicitly
rejected by the United States Supreme Court in the Stone casethat had no "indoctrinating" effect on students.'
Should we say, then, reversing the title of a book by Peter
Berger, Grace Davie, and Effie Fokas, "Religious Europe, Secular
America"?' No, that statement would be inaccurate. The two
labels do not reflect the complexity and variety of the case law of
the two courts. Moreover, the cultural climates of Europe and
Professor of Law and Religion, University of Milan.
1 449 U.S. 39, 42-43 (1980).
2Id.
at 41.
Lautsi v. Italy, No. 30814/06, 78 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Mar. 18, 2011), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-104040.
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5 PETER BERGER ET AL., RELIGIOUS AMERICA, SECULAR EUROPE? A THEME AND
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the United States have profoundly changed in the thirty years
separating Stone and Lautsi. The latest United States Supreme
Court decisions on this subject- Van Orden v. Perry,' Pleasant
Grove City v. Summum, 7 and Salazar v. Buono,8 -are much
closer to the judgment of the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR in
Lautsi.' They show that "La Revanche de Dieu," or "The Revenge
of God,"-to quote another book, written by Gilles Kepel in the
early 90s'o-has found its way not only into public opinion but
also courtrooms on both sides of the Atlantic.
In this Article I describe how complex the concept of the
religious symbol is. In Part II, I argue that we must accept the
inherent ambiguity of religious symbols because it is impossible,
in most cases, to clearly distinguish symbols' cultural and
religious meanings. One must always consider at least two
factors: the place where symbols are located and the context in
which they are displayed. Next, in Part III, I argue that one
must deconstruct the notion of "public space" in order to avoid
applying the same standards to profoundly different realities,
such as a square and a courtroom.
Finally, in Part IV,
addressing the issue of context, I conclude by defending the
presence of a plurality of religious symbols in the public space.
The neutrality of public institutions, I argue, may in fact be
understood in an inclusive manner, making it possible to accept
the presence of different religious symbols without having to
mask their religious significance behind the screen of a country's
cultural tradition. Before doing all this, however, in Part I, I
briefly discuss the reasons why religious symbols have become
one of the "hottest" and most controversial issues in today's
political debate, and the strategies adopted by European
countries in tackling this problem.

6
7

545 U.S. 677 (2005).

555 U.S. 460 (2009).
* 559 U.S. 700 (2010).
9 Frederick Mark Gedicks, Undoing Neutrality? From Church-State Separation
to Judeo-Christian Tolerance, 46

WILLAMETTE L. REV.

691, 691-706

(2010)

(highlighting the change in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence).
10 GILLES KEPEL, LA REVANCHE DE DIEU: CHRTIENS, JUIFS ET MUSULMANS A
LA RECONQUtTE DU MONDE (1991).
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RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS: GLOBAL PROBLEM AND LOCAL
SOLUTIONS

Just a few examples are enough to show that the conflicts
around religious symbols have acquired a global dimension and
occur with equal intensity in countries with profoundly different
cultural backgrounds, religious traditions, and political
institutions. In 2006, the Supreme Court of Canada, in a
judgment that has become famous, upheld the right of a Sikh
student to wear a ritual dagger, or kirpan, at school." In 2009,
the Indian Supreme Court ruled on the legality of religious
symbols on political campaign posters.12 In the last thirty years,
the display of the Ten Commandments and other religious
symbols in public places has been the subject of numerous
rulings in American courts." In Turkey, the ban on female
students wearing the Islamic headscarf in universities continues
to be at the center of political and legal debate.14 Two laws in
France-one enacted in 2004 and the other in 2010-prohibited
the wearing of conspicuous religious symbols at schools and the
wearing of headscarves that cover the face in all public spaces,
including streets. This was a provision clearly aimed at

n See Multani v. Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, [2006] S.C.R. 256,
para. 4 (Can.).
12 Dhananjay Mahapatra, Religion in Poll Symbols? We Can
Do Nothing: SC,
TIMES OF INDIA (Mar. 24, 2009, 1:08 AM), http://articles.timesofindia.india
times.com/2009-03-24/india/28046151_1_election-symbol-free-symbols-unrecognisedparties.
13 See, e.g., Salazar, 559 U.S at 706-07 (2010); Pleasant Grove City v. Summum,
555 U.S. 460, 464 (2009); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 681 (2005); McCreary
Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 850-51 (2005); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,
687 (1984); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 39-40 (1980).
"' See John Witte, Jr. & Nina-Louisa Arold, Lift High the Cross?: Contrasting
the New European and American Cases on Religious Symbols on Government
Property, 25 EMORY INTL L. REV. 5, 23-25 (2011).

10

JOURNAL OF CATHOLIC LEGAL STUDIES

[Vol. 52:7

preventing the use of the burqa and niqab. In Italy, the display
of crucifixes in classrooms has been the subject of two conflicting
judgments by the ECtHR.16
It is not necessary to continue with examples.
It is
sufficiently clear that religious symbols have become a catalyst
for conflicts generated by the new role that religions play in the
public space. Contrary to the predictions of many observers,
religions have gained prominence and visibility, becoming
capable of mobilizing populations and attracting the interest of
the media and broad swaths of public opinion.17 Consequently,
political use of religious symbols has increased, sometimes
against the will of, but sometimes with the encouragement of,
religious representatives themselves. In the squares of Cairo,
the green flags of Islam are the sign of the political and social
transformation of Egypt; in the cities of Tibet, the orange robes of
Buddhist monks have become the icon of the struggle for
independence; in Poland, the use of Catholic symbolism was a
powerful weapon to overthrow the Communist regime. Even
nations do not hesitate to use religious symbols for political
purposes, sometimes with disastrous results: In the Balkan
wars, the systematic destruction of the enemy's religious symbols
ended a long tradition of peaceful interreligious coexistence.
Religious conflict, which is inherent in the political use of
religious symbols, has been accentuated by increasing religious
pluralism. Everywhere in the world, as a result of migratory
flows, religious demographics are rapidly changing. Christianity
is declining in the Middle East but is soaring in the Arabian
Peninsula and in some Asian countries like South Korea. Europe
15 Loi 2010-1192 du 11 octobre 2010 interdisant la dissimulation du visage dans
l'espace public [Law 2010-1192 of October 11, 2010 Prohibiting the Concealment of

the Face in Public Space], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA R9PUBLIQUE FRANQAISE [J.O.1

[OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Apr. 11, 2011, p. 18344; Loi 2004-228 du 15 mars
2004 encadrant, en application du principe de laicit6, le port de signes ou de tenues
manifestant une appartenance religieuse dans les 6coles, collges et lyc6es publics
[Law 2004-228 of March 15, 2004 Regulating, in Accordance with the Principle of
Secularism, the Wearing of Signs or Dress Manifesting a Religious Affiliation in
Schools, Colleges and Public Schools], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE

FRANQAISE [J.O.1 [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Mar. 15, 2004, p. 5190.
16 See supra text accompanying note 5; Lautsi v. Italy, No. 30814/06,
56 (Eur.
Ct. H.R. Mar. 18, 2011), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/
search.aspx?i=001-104040.
17 See KEPEL, supra note 10; JOSi CASANOVA, PUBLIC RELIGIONS IN THE
MODERN WORLD 3 (1994) (highlighting this trend approximately twenty years ago).

2013]

STATE-SUPPORTED RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS

11

is home to an increasing number of Muslims. Latin America,
which was completely Catholic until twenty years ago, now has a
large Protestant population. People who do not identify with any
religion make up more than twelve percent of the U.S. population
and eighteen percent of the population in Europe.1 8 These
changes are not painless, and the tensions they cause easily
affect religious symbols. Good examples of tensions include the
attacks on Christian churches in Nigeria and India, and without
getting to that level of violence, the difficulty of opening mosques
in many European countries, and the ban on minarets in
Switzerland.
The presence of religious symbols in the public space is
therefore a global problem. But the strategies to address it are
different. Although the problem is the same, each country makes
use of the particular tools that are available in its arsenal of
cultural and legal traditions. Broadly speaking, it is possible to
identify three strategies with which European countries are
trying to manage the issue of the state-supported display of
religious symbols in the public space. The first option is to
emphasize the secular character of the public space. France
followed this path, first with the 1905 law on the separation of
church and state and more recently with the two laws of 2004
and 2010." These three laws mark a steady increase in the
implementation of the principle of secularism. In 1905, public
institutions were forbidden to display religious symbols;2 0 in
2004, students were forbidden to enter public institutions
wearing conspicuous religious symbols; 2 ' and, in 2010, this
prohibition was extended-in reference to the burqa and niqab18 National Profiles: United States (General), ASSOCIATION OF RELIGION DATA
ARcHIvEs, http://www.thearda.com/internationalData/regions/index.asp (last visited
June 17, 2012).
'
See Loi du 9 d6cembre 1905 concernant la s6paration des Eglises et de 1'Etat
[Law of December 9, 1905 on the Separation of Church and State], JOURNAL
OFFICIEL DE LA RtPUBLIQUE FRANQAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], may
19, 2011, art. 28; Loi 2010-1192 du 11 octobre 2010; Loi 2004-228 du 15 mars 2004;
JOHN R. BOWEN, WHY THE FRENCH DON'T LIKE HEADSCARVES: ISLAM, THE STATE,
AND PUBLIC SPACE 18-19 (2007); Christian Joppke, Limits of Restricting Islam: The
French Burqa Law of 2010 1 (Jan. 25, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.unige.ch/ses/socio/rechetpub/dejeuner/dejeuner20lO-2011/chapter.burka
2010.pdf.
20 Caitlin Killian, From a Community of Believers to an Islam of the Heart:
"Conspicuous" Symbols, Muslim Practices, and the Privatization of Religion in
France, 68 SOC. OF RELIGION 305, 308 (2007).
21 Id.
at 307-08.
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to all public spaces, including streets and squares. 22 The
prohibition of religious symbols, originally limited to public
institutions, was extended first to people at public institutionsstudents at school-and later-only with reference to the burqa
and niqab-to people in any public space whatsoever.23
The second strategy is to favor the dominant religion in a
This strategy is exemplified by Italy's policy of
country.
displaying crucifixes in schools, courtrooms, and other public
offices.24 In this case, symbols of the dominant religion are
considered part of the cultural identity of the nation and thus
shielded from criticisms that they infringe on religious freedom
and equality.
The third strategy is more complex. It prohibits public
institutions from displaying religious symbols but allows public
employees to wear them. This is the case, for example, in Great
Britain, where courts, public schools, and police barracks do not
display religious symbols, but teachers, judges, and police officers
may wear them. 25 Albeit with conspicuous exceptions, notably
those arising from the existence of a Church established by law,
the dividing line runs between public institutions as such-which
may not have religious characteristics-and the representatives
of these institutions, who may manifest their religious beliefs
through the wearing of symbols even when they are exercising
their official functions.
Each of these models manifests the historical, cultural, and
religious traditions of the country concerned; each, therefore, is
not easily exportable to Nation States with different legal and
political systems. This does not mean that each is equally
22 Steven Erlanger, ParliamentMoves France Closer to a Ban on Facial Veils,
N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2010, at A6.
23 Places of worship are the exception. See Olivia Bui-Xuan, L'espace public:
L'dmergence d'une nouvelle catigoriejuridique? [Public Space: The Emergence of a
New Legal Category?], 27 REVUE FRANQAISE DE DROIT ADMINISTRATIF [R.F.D.A.]
551, 551-59 (2011) (Fr.), available at http://www.dalloz.fr/documentation/
lien?famille=revues&dochype=RFDA/CHRON/2011/0123.
24 See Lauso Zagato, La <sagadell'esposizione del crocifisso nelle aule: simbolo
passivo o spia di un (drammatico) mutamento di paradigma?, in DEMOCRAZIE E
RELIGIONT: LA SFIDA DEGLI INCOMIPATIBLI? 169-93 (Mario Ruggenini et al. eds.,
2011). See generally EDOARDO DIENI ET AL., I SIMBOLI RELIGIOSI TRA DIRIrTO E
CULTURE (Edoardo Dieni et al. eds., 2006).
' See generally Silvio Ferrari, Religion in the European Public Spaces: A Legal
Overview, in RELIGION IN PUBLIC SPACES: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE (Silvio Ferrari
& Sabrina Pastorelli eds., 2012).
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respectful of religious freedom and equality such that each can be
defended by invoking the "margin of appreciation" that the
ECtHR case law grants member states. 26 As reiterated by the
ECtHR in the Lautsi case, the existence of a "margin of
appreciation" does not exempt states from complying with the
Convention's rules on religious freedom and equality.2 7
Therefore, it is necessary to examine the particular solutions that
each country has adopted with reference to state-supported
religious displays in order to assess the compatibility of those
solutions with the provisions of the Convention.
This
examination, however, cannot be performed without a few
preliminary remarks on the nature of religious symbols.
II. THE UNAVOIDABLE AMBIGUITY OF SYMBOLS

By nature, a symbol is a complex reality embodying a
plurality of meanings. It is almost never the case that a
symbol-a cross, a veil, a kippa, etcetera-has a single meaning
that can be ascertained in objective terms. A symbol carries a
plurality of meanings that, on a case-by-case basis, depend both
on the person who displays the symbol and the person who views
it. It is possible to illustrate this point with a short example.
Imagine a woman who walks the streets of a city wearing a veil.
Passers-by observe her. One of them understands the veil as a
religious symbol, another as the sign of the subjugation of women
to male power, a third as an ornament that emphasizes the
beauty of the female face. One of the passers-by, more curious
than the others, asks her why she wears the veil. The woman
answers that she wears it because she comes from a family where
women have always worn the veil, that she chose a green veil
because green is the color of Islam and also, she adds with a
smile, because it matches the green color of her eyes.
This simple narrative shows that symbols are intrinsically
polysemic.28 The hammer and sickle are not only two tools for
work but the symbol of an ideology and a political party; the Star
26 See ANDREW LEGG, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION IN INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW: DEFERENCE AND PROPORTIONALITY (2012) (discussing the margin of

appreciation).
27 Lautsi v. Italy, No. 30814/06,
68 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Mar. 18, 2011), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-104040.
28 See Luigi Lombardi Vallauri, Simboli e realizzazione, in EDOARDO DIENI ET
AL.,
SYMBOLON/DIABOLON:
SIMBOLI,
MULTICULTURALE, 13, 13-36 (2005).
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of David is not only two interlaced triangles, but the symbol of a
State. When it becomes a symbol, an object or a sign adds to its
original meaning another meaning, derived from the new reality
that is expressed by the symbol. To repeat what I said a moment
ago, a symbol that is commonly defined as religious-a cross, a
veil, a kippa-almost never has only a religious meaning, but
rather, brings with it a variety of meanings that depend, on a
case-by-case basis, both on the person who wears or displays the
symbol and the person who observes it.
In other words, the unavoidable ambiguity of a symbol has
an internal and an external dimension. Starting with the latter,
a symbol may acquire different meanings according to the
viewer's perception, as shown by the reactions of passers-by to
the woman who wears the veil. These different perceptions are
not irrelevant from a legal point of view. If the veil is seen as a
religious symbol, it is protected by laws on the freedom to
manifest religion or belief; if the veil is seen as the symbol of
female subjugation, it is condemned by the laws that prohibit
discrimination based on sex. But how should a court ascertain,
in a specific case, whether a veil is worn freely, as a matter of
religious choice, or by imposition of the husband, the father, or
the brothers? This question brings us to the second dimension of
ambiguity, which concerns the person who herself wears or
displays the symbol. A woman can wear a cross around her neck
for ornamental reasons, religious reasons, or both; that is, she
may wear it because the cross has a shape that is particularly
well suited to the cut of her dress, or because the cross manifests
her Christian faith, or for both reasons. If worn in a workplace,
where it is forbidden to wear religious symbols, a cross could pose
problems, but how should a court determine, in each particular
case, whether the cross is worn for aesthetic or religious reasons?
By asking these questions I want to make clear that any
investigation of the meaning of a symbol-to determine whether
it is religious, cultural, ethnic, political, and so on-inevitably
leads to an examination of the intentions of the person who
displays it and the perceptions of those who are exposed to it.
This twofold aspect of the problem-expressed by the duality of
intention and perception-has not escaped the attention of legal
commentators. For example, Adam Linkner, analyzing the
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United States case, Salazar v. Buono,2 9 addressed the issue of
state-supported displays of religious symbols through a two-part
test. The first, which is defined as "the inside perspective," aims
at examining whether "the predominant purpose or intent of a
government action is to promote religion," and the second, the
"outside perspective," consists of examining whether, to a
hypothetical reasonable observer, "the effect of the government's
conduct appears to endorse religion.""o Linkner's suggestion is
interesting, but it does not solve the difficulties lawyers
encounter when they attempt an inevitably subjective analysis of
intentions and perceptions. 3 ' Law, in fact, has few tools to
investigate what canonists call the forum internum, i.e. the
conscience or mind, a problem that emerged clearly a few years
ago in connection with the attempt to regulate the so-called new
religious movements.3 2
The inability of law to understand, distinguish, and regulate
the multiple meanings of symbols often generates a sense of
frustration that results in two opposite responses. The first is
simply to give up addressing the problem in legal terms in favor
of an exclusively political solution. The clearest example of this
attitude comes from Switzerland, where citizens went to the polls
to decide whether Muslims had the right to build minarets."
This response-an apparently blameless call for democracy-in
fact, hides rather an unacceptable abdication of law: One cannot
legitimately submit the freedom of religion to a majority decision
559 U.S. 700 (2010).
Adam Linkner, How Salazar v. Buono Synthesizes the Supreme Court's
Establishment Clause Precedent into a Single Test, 25 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 57, 59
(2011).
31 In Salazar, two Justices reached opposite conclusions about a cross on public
land, using the same "reasonable observer" test. For one (Justice Stevens), the cross
would have been seen by this hypothetical observer as "government endorsement of
religion"; for the other (Justice Alito), as a "commemoration of those who died in
World War I." Id. at 68-69.
32 See generally James T. Richardson, Regulating Religion: A Sociological and
29

30

HistoricalIntroduction, in REGULATING RELIGION: CASE STUDIES FROM AROUND THE

GLOBE 1, 1-20 (James T. Richardson ed., 2004) (discussing the issue of "new
religious movements"). It is not a coincidence that the states (Belgium and France),
that a few years ago passed laws against the "new religious movements," are the
same ones that have now adopted laws banning the burqa/niqab. See ALESSANDRO
FERRARI & SABRINA PASTORELLI, THE BURQA AFFAIR ACROSS EUROPE: BETWEEN
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SPACE (2013).
3 See generally, Marcel Stuissi, Banning of Minarets:Addressing the Validity of
a Controversial Swiss Popular Initiative, 3 RELIGION & HUM. RTS 135 (2008);
Ferrari, supra note 25.
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as if fundamental rights of the human person could be put to a
vote. The second response is the opposite of the first: to solve the
problem in authoritarian terms, establishing once and for all
what is the "authentic" meaning of a symbol. The most obvious
manifestation of this tendency is found in the French
Constitutional Council's decision upholding the law prohibiting
the wearing of the burqa and niqab in all public places. The
Council's decision states that women's self-determination is
irrelevant. Even if the decision to wear this garment is made in
a free and conscious way, the Council stated, women are in an
objective "situation of exclusion and inferiority patently
incompatible with constitutional principles of liberty and
equality." 4 That is, the Council assumed that the burqa and
niqab is, always and everywhere, a symbol of women's
marginalization and inferiority, and ignored the possibility that
the garment can also have other meanings. This conclusion is
clearly unacceptable. But the opposite attitude, characterized by
the resigned abdication to the role of law, is also unsatisfactory.
It opens the way for the "law of the strongest," which in turn can
be the parents who force their daughter to wear the full veil
when leaving the house or the majority of the citizens of a State
that democratically decide to ban the construction of minarets.
This unsatisfactory choice between abstention and
intervention cannot be avoided through an analysis focused
exclusively on the religious or cultural significance of symbols
because, as we have seen, the same symbol can have different
meanings for different people and sometimes even for the same
person. For example, the Italian courts' insistence on the
exclusively cultural significance of the classroom crucifix is the
most unsatisfactory element of their reasoning on the question. 5
Apart from the implausible results to which this insistence
leads," a cultural defense of the crucifix implicitly devalues its
religious significance and, indirectly, endorses the principle that
a symbol can be displayed in a public institution only if the
34 Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2010-613DC,
Oct. 7, 2010, J.O. 1, 1 (Fr.).
** See the contributions of Jlia Pasquali Cerioli, Claudio Martinelli, and Nicola
Fiorita published in DIENI ET AL., supra note 24. On the latest developments, see
Zagato, supra note 24.

36

See Andrew Koppelman, The New American Civil Religion: Lessons for Italy,

41 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 861, 872 (2010) ("The claim that the crucified Christ
simply stands for civic values is one that cannot be made with a straight face.").
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symbol has no religious character.
Before accepting this
conclusion, which a little paradoxically coincides with that of the
strongest supporters of state secularism, I believe it is
appropriate to take into account whether the examination of the
religious or cultural meaning of a symbol should not be
accompanied by a consideration of the place where the symbol is
displayed. This second line of inquiry leads us to consider the
notion of the public space."
III. DECONSTRUCTING THE PUBLIC SPACE?

A few years ago, Jirgen Habermas proposed a distinction
between the political and institutional public sphere." The first
of these, the political sphere, is the space of debate and
discussion where the public discourse takes shape. It should not
be understood only as a space of intellectual "argumentation
about the truth value of propositions," but more broadly as "a
realm of creativity and social imaginaries in which citizens give
shared form to their lives together, a realm of exploration,
experiment, and partial agreements." 9 In Robert Cover's words,
it is the space where new "normative worlds" take shape. It can
be a metaphorical-mass media, internet, etcetera-as well as a
physical space-a political rally in a square, for example. In
order to perform its creative function, the political space should
be free and pluralistic: The visible presence of different religions
and beliefs in this area is indispensable for the pluralism on
which a democratic society is based.

11 See generally Ferrari, supra note 25.
3 Jitrgen Habermas, Religion in the Public Sphere, 14 EUR. J. PHIL. 1, 1-25
(2006). See Philippe Portier, Religion and Democracy in the Thought of Jurgen

Habermas,48 Soc'Y 426, 426-32 (2011).
19

JUDITH BUTLER ET AL., THE POWER OF RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE 129

(Eduardo Mendieta & Jonathan VanAntwerpen eds., 2011).
4o Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative,97 HARv. L. REV. 4, 4 (1983) (arguing
that every person lives in a normative universe that is defined as "a world of right
and wrong, of lawful and unlawful, of valid and void"). Religious communities are a
good example of these normative worlds: They are places where new legal meanings
are created through the personal commitment of the community members, who
apply their will to transform the "extant state of affairs" according to their "visions
of alternative futures." Id. at 9.
" See Metro. Church of Bessarabia v. Moldova, No. 45701/99, [ 114 (Eur. Ct.
H.R. Dec. 14, 2001), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.
aspx?i=001-59985.
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The institutional public space, by contrast, is the place where
coercive deliberations, compulsory for all, take placeparliament, the law courts, public administration, etcetera. It is
not only the space of debate and discussion, but also the space for
decisions that, once taken, have to be respected by everybody.4 2
The law court is not a television talk show. One does not go to
court to have a nice chat with a judge. One goes there to obtain
an enforceable judgment about who is right and who is wrong. In
order to gain the general respect and recognition that is required
for the enforcement of such binding decisions, the institutional
public space must not only be, but must also be seen to be, fair
and impartial.
A public-that is state-school provides a good testing
ground for understanding the differences and also the
similarities between the political and institutional space. A
school is primarily a space of the first type, where a process of
communication and exchange between individuals with different
conceptions and life experiences takes place. From this point of
view, it is essential to ensure freedom of expression and the
plurality of experiences. The prohibition of wearing religious
symbols at school, which is in force in some European countries,
affects negatively the role performed by this political space in a
plural society: It limits the students' freedom to manifest their
religion and can be justified only on the ground of the protection
of a legitimate and pressing social need that must be assessed
But a public school is at the same time an
case by case.
institutional space, which must be characterized by neutrality
towards different religious-or non-religious--convictions, both
of students and teachers.
From this point of view, the
compulsory display of a religious symbol-for example, a
crucifix-can be problematic, as it indicates the public
institution's preference for a specific religion.

42 Dominique Wolton writes that in this space-he calls it "political space," but
it corresponds to what I call "institutional space"-"il ne s'agit ni de discuter ni de
ddlib6rer, mais de d~cider et d'agir." Dominique Wolton, Espace Public, DOMINIQUE
WOLTON, http://www.wolton.cnrs.fr/spip.php?article67 (last visited Sept. 15, 2013).
4
For this reason, the rules that were in force in France before 2004, when the
school principal had the power to prevent students from wearing religious symbols if
they caused an actual perturbation of the school life, were more in line with the
approach supported in the text than the present rule, based on a general prohibition.
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Of course, these two spheres-political and institutionalare not strictly separated. In many cases they coexist and
overlap: A parliament is a place of debate and decision-making
at the same time. Keeping in mind this caveat, the distinction
proposed by Habermas has the merit of emphasizing that the
place where a religious symbol is displayed is not irrelevant. A
crucifix hung on the wall of a courtroom is one thing; a crucifix
that stands in the corner of a square is another. Even if the state
sponsors both, the difference remains. In the first case, the
presence of the crucifix may suggest that the administration of
justice is not impartial because it is influenced by the tenets of a
religion. In the second, this danger does not exist. In the first
case, a person who wants to receive justice is obliged to go to a
courtroom where the crucifix is displayed; in the second, a person
can change his or her path and avoid crossing the square where
the crucifix is placed if he or she does not want to see it.
However, it is not only a matter of space. The individuals
who inhabit the space act in different capacities. A public school,
for example, is attended both by students and teachers, but only
the latter are state employees. Students and teachers share the
same space but act in a different capacity. Therefore, the degree
of freedom that is granted to students may be greater than that
accorded to teachers. For example, in many European countries
students can wear religious symbols that teachers are not
allowed to wear because the teachers represent a public
institution." The religious symbol is the same, but the position
of the person who wears it is different: As a consequence,
limitations that are unacceptable in one case can be legitimate in
the other.
These remarks lead to a conclusion: The legitimacy of a
religious symbol displayed in public institutions, or by
individuals who represent these institutions, must be subject to a
standard more rigorous than that applied to a religious symbol
4
This point was made by the European Court of Human Rights in the case
Dahlab v. Switzerland, where a teacher wanted to wear an Islamic headscarf at
school, and the Court decided that "[a]s a civil servant, she represented the State; on
that account, her conduct should not suggest that the State identified itself with one
religion rather than another." Dahlab v. Switzerland, No. 42393/98, at 9 (Eur. Ct.
H.R. Feb. 15, 2001), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.
aspx?i=001-22643; see also Kurtulmus v. Turkey, No. 65500/01 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan.
24, 2006), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=00188325.
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displayed outside public institutions or by individuals who act in
a personal capacity.
All things being equal, the cultural
significance of a religious symbol can be accepted more easily in
the second case. In the first case, the connection between
religion and state is closer, and the risk that the display of the
symbol will be perceived as state support to religion is higher.
Therefore, the insider/outsider test proposed by Linkner should
be combined with another test aimed at evaluating the
characteristics of the place where the symbol is displayed and the
individual who displays it. In this way the excess of subjectivism
that characterizes the insider/outsider test is corrected by the
reference to an element-the political or institutional character
of public space-that can be evaluated in more objective terms.
IV. THE PLURALITY OF THE INSTITUTIONAL SPACE: A PATH To
EXPLORE?

The arguments I have developed so far seem to go in the
following direction: Political public space should be pluralistic,
and therefore open to religious symbols, while institutional
public space should be neutral, and therefore exclude the
presence of these symbols. In reality, this is not my conclusion. I
believe that in some cases the neutrality that must characterize
the institutional public space requires the exclusion of religious
symbols, but I think that in other cases the same neutrality can
be ensured by the inclusion of a number of different religious
symbols in that space. The difference depends on the context in
which the religious symbol is placed. At least implicitly, the
context is taken into account in many decisions of the United
States Supreme Court, which has repeatedly drawn a distinction
between situations in which government supports the display of
a specific religious symbol and those in which government
supports the display of the symbols of different religious as well
as non-religious conceptions of life and the world. In the latter
situation, it is more difficult to understand the government's
support as an endorsement of a particular religion or even
religion in general. The context plays a less pronounced role in
the case law of the Strasbourg Court and of the national courts in
Europe, where the main issue is the right of the state and other
public authorities to display the symbol of a particular religion in
public institutions. Nevertheless, I believe that the attempt to
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guarantee the neutrality of the institutional space by including a
number of religious and non-religious symbols should not be
discarded a priori.
Let me start with an easy case, a teacher in a public school.
In a public school where teachers are allowed to wear the
symbols of their religion-the Christian cross, the Jewish kippa,
the Islamic veil, the Sikh turban, etcetera-the neutrality of the
institution is no less guaranteed than in a public school where
teachers are forbidden to wear these symbols. One could even
argue that, in the first case, neutrality is better assured because
the school mirrors the plurality of conceptions of life and the
world that students find outside the school space. This example
shows that the neutrality of a public institution may be
guaranteed through inclusion, and not only through exclusion, by
allowing a plurality of religious and non-religious symbols and
not by excluding them all.
To be sure, it is not always easy to follow this path. The
display of the crucifix in the classrooms of public schools
indicates the problems that may arise. I did not like the first
decision of the ECtHR in the Lautsi case, which required removal
of the crucifix from Italian schools, and I equally disliked the
second decision, which confirmed the right to display the symbol
Both judgments are affected, in my
of one religion only."
opinion, by the same shortcoming. They fail to consider the
views of the people-students, teachers, non-teaching staff-who
live in the school: Their opinion is considered insignificant. This
binary logic, based on the alternative between elimination of all
religious symbols and display of the symbol of the majority
religion only, cannot work anymore in a country like Italy, which
is becoming religiously pluralistic. In this setting, all the persons
who, in different capacities, attend the school must be involved in
the decision-making process. It is not impossible: Something
similar has already been done in relation to the celebration of
religious festivities. Today, not only Christmas but also the end
of Ramadan and other religious holidays are celebrated in Italian
schools. It is not something unheard of: Mechanisms of
4
Lautsi v. Italy, No. 30814/06, 57 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 3, 2009), available at
(referred to the
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-95589
Grand Chamber on March 1, 2010); Lautsi v. Italy, No. 30814/06, 76 (Eur. Ct. H.R.
Mar. 18, 2011), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.
aspx?i=001-104040.
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consultation about the display of the crucifix are already in place
in some European countries, such as Romania,46 and in some
German Lander, such as Bavaria.4 7 It may be that, at the end of
this consultation process, it will still be impossible to reach a
mutually agreed solution: In that case, a choice will be required
between the application of the majority rule and the recourse to
neutrality by exclusion, that is, by banning all religious symbols
from schools. But even when a shared decision cannot be
reached, consultation and dialogue are not a wasted effort.
Through them, the issue of religious symbols becomes part of the
educational process. The display of a religious symbol in the
classroom is discussed and, whatever decision is taken at the end
of the debate, people are compelled to accept their
responsibilities. In this way, the crucifix--or another religious
symbol-is no longer perceived as something obvious and
irrelevant, as is frequently the case when its display follows from
a legal command and not the informed decision of the
stakeholders.

46

See generally Gizela Horvdth & Rozdlia Bak6, Religious Icons in Romanian

Schools: Text and Context, 8 J. FOR STUDY RELIGIONS & IDEOLOGIES 189 (2009)

(discussing the display of religious symbols in the Romanian schools). The Romanian
Supreme Court decided in 2008 and 2009 that the display of religious symbols,
although not mandatory, is legitimate. The decision is up to the parties involved at
the local level.
4
See Tobias Lock, Of Crucifixes and Headscarves: Religious Symbols in
German Schools, in LAW, RELIGIOUS FREEDOMS AND EDUCATION IN EUROPE 347,

352 (Myriam Hunter-Henin ed., 2011).

